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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DENNIS RICHARD VIGH,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 930204-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and 8(l)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1993), and
possession of cocaine, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) and 8(2)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1993).

Because the foregoing

offenses were committed within a 1,000 feet of school property,
the convictions were enhanced to second degree felonies, under
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5)(a) and 8(5)(c) (Supp. 1993).
Defendant also appeals from a conviction for possession of
marijuana without tax stamps affixed, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-105, 59-19-106 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the warrant authorizing the search of

defendant's residence supported by probable cause?

A magistrate's probable cause determination is given
great deference on review.
(1983).

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236

The affidavit supporting a search warrant application

must, however, provide a "'substantial basis for determining the
existence of probable cause.'" United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 915 (1984) (quoting Gates. 462 U.S. at 239). The
"substantial basis" requirement entails limited review of the
magistrate's determination, asking only whether the affidavit
contains sufficient factual information upon which a magistrate
could have found probable cause.

See Gates 462 U.S. at 236.

This Court reviews the trial court's "factual findings
underlying the denial of a motion to suppress evidence under a
'clearly erroneous' standard," and the trial court's conclusions
of law based thereon are reviewed for correctness.

State v.

Brooks. 849 P.2d 640, 643 (Utah App.), cert, denied. No. 930182,
Aug. 11, 1993 (unpublished order).
2.

Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's

finding that counts I-II were committed within 1,000 feet of a
school for purposes of sentence enhancement under Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(5)(a) and (5)(c) (Supp. 1993)?
In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, Utah
appellate courts view the evidence and all inferences that may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
jury verdict.

State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985);

State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992), cert,
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
2

A jury verdict will only be

reversed where reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah

1989); Lemons, 844 P.2d at 381.
3.

Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's

conviction for possession of cocaine?
The standard of review for this issue is the same as
that set forth in issue (2), supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and 8(1)(b)(ii)
(Supp. 1993) and possession of cocaine, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 8(2)(b)(ii)
(Supp. 1993).

The State further charged the foregoing offenses

should be enhanced to second degree felonies, under Utah Code
Ann. §§ 58-37-8(5)(a) and 8(5)(c) (Supp. 1993), because they were
committed within a 1,000 feet of a school. Additionally, the
State charged defendant with possession of marijuana without tax
stamps affixed, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 59-19-105, 59-19-106 (1990) (R. 204),

3

Defendant filed multiple pro se motions, including a
motion to suppress contraband seized during a warrant-supported
search of his mobile home in alleged violation of the fourth
amendment (R. 40).
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, wherein
defendant was represented by privately retained counsel, the
trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. 77, 28687) .
A jury trial was held February 4, 1993 and defendant
was convicted as charged (R. 155, 160-162).
The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent,
enhanced terms of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison
for counts I-II, and one consecutive term of zero to five years
in the Utah State Prison for count III (R. 231, 246).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

The Warrant-Supported Search

The critical facts are set forth in the search warrant
affidavit (R. 79, attached as Addendum A).

The affidavit was

submitted by Officer Gary Haws of the Bountiful City Police
Department, an experienced narcotics officer, and had been
reviewed by a county attorney (R. 260-62, 324-27), see Addendum
A-

Officer Haws sought a warrant to search defendant's mobile

home for:
Controlled substances including marijuana and
cocaine[.] Items of drug paraphernalia[.]
Documents evidencing the sale of controlled
substances[.] Documents evidencing the

4

ownership and occupancy of the residence
(and) [m]oney.
Id.
1.

Confidential Informant

The affidavit set forth information obtained from a
confidential informant who received no "remuneration for the
information provided."

See Addendum A.

The informant told

Officer Haws that he/she "[was] knowledgeable about marijuana
because [he/she] had used it in the past."

Id.

The informant

then reported that defendant "is engaged in the sale of marijuana
and cocaine."

Id.

Specifically, the informant alleged he/she

had "seen" marijuana, cocaine and drug paraphernalia "in
[defendant's] presence" and "at [defendant's] residence during
the last 10 days."

Id.

The informant provided Officer Haws with

defendant's address, stating that defendant lived "a few blocks
south of Crown Billiards," in the "Clearfield Trailer Park, #66."
Id.
Additionally, the informant stated that "during the
last 10 days" he/she observed marijuana "in [defendant's]
presence in his (defendant's) vehicle."

See Addendum A.

The

informant described defendant's vehicle as a "1988 Ford Tempo,
two-door, creme in color, license number 217 EVE."

Id.

Finally, the informant stated that defendant "was
selling a large amount of controlled substance" and that he

5

consequently kept "a large amount of money" at Pam Tucker's1
home in Sunset, Utah.

See Addendum A.

According to the

informant, defendant had been under Tucker's home and "may have
stashed something there."
2.

Id.

Verification and Corroboration

Although Officer Haws had not previously known or
worked with the informant (R. 262-63), he and other investigating
officers were able to verify and corroborate the information
provided.

Specifically, investigating officers verified that

defendant lived in the Clearfield Trailer Park at #66.
Addendum A.

See

The investigating officers were also able to verify

that a 1989 Ford with license plate number 217 EVE was registered
in defendant's name.

Id.

Officer Haws conducted a consensual search of Pam
Tucker's home in Sunset, Utah, and discovered "three to four
pounds of marijuana underneath the home in a crawl space."
Addendum A.
cash.

See

The search also revealed approximately $12,000 in

Id.
Finally, Officer Haws obtained defendant's criminal

history which revealed that defendant had been previously
convicted in June 1986 for arranging the sale of a controlled
substance, and attempted distribution of a controlled substance,

1

Although not stated in the affidavit, Officer Haws
testified at a subsequent hearing that Tucker was defendant's
girlfriend (R. 267-69).
€

both third degree felonies.

See Addendum A.2

Further,

defendant was charged with possession of controlled substances in
1980 and in 1983, and as recently as March, 1990, which latter
charge was "disposed of by diversion."

Id.

Based on the foregoing, the search warrant affidavit
requested authority to conduct a daytime search.

See Addendum A.

This request was buttressed by Officer Haws statement that he
believed the "information reliable based upon the fact that the
informant has come forward as a citizen and [was] not receiving
any renumeration for the information provided."
4.

Id.

Seizure of Evidence

The search warrant was issued as requested on June 16,
1992 (R. 79, 268, 282), see Addendum A.

Pursuant thereto,

officers seized approximately one pound of marijuana (R. 369),
and baggies, scales, and other drug paraphernalia containing
cocaine residue (R. 479-483).
Defendant was arrested just prior to the execution of
the search warrant, based on the discovery of contraband at Pam
Tucker's home (R. 372). The following items were seized incident
to defendant's arrest:

defendant's driver's license (which also

contained cocaine residue), approximately $6,028 in cash, and a
bottle of Prozac, in the name of another individual (R. 329-30,
492-93).

2

Officer Haws attached to the instant affidavit, copies
of a search warrant affidavit and search warrant executed in
December 1985, which apparently lead to defendant's 1986
convictions. See Addendum A.
7

5.

Motion to Suppress

Defendant filed a pro se motion to suppress the
evidence seized pursuant to the warrant-supported search of his
trailer (R. 40, attached as Addendum B).

Specifically, defendant

alleged that information concerning his prior criminal history
was improperly included in the search warrant affidavit in
violation of the fifth, fourth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution.

Id.

Defendant retained counsel to represent him at a
hearing on his various pro se motions held October 27, 1992 (R.
255).

In conjunction with the motion to suppress, defendant's

hearing counsel argued defendant's pro se motion for discovery
(R. 38-39), wherein defendant requested the State to reveal the
confidential informant's identity (R. 256). In support of his
motion, defendant examined Officer Haws in an attempt to
demonstrate the officer either intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly included false information in the affidavit (R. 259).
The court denied defendant's discovery motion,
concluding "there was no substantial preliminary showing that
Detective Haws intentionally or knowingly or with reckless
disregard for truth, falsely swore relative to any information
received from the informant[;]" thus, defendant had not
demonstrated a basis for identifying the informant (R. 91, a
complete copy of the trial court's Order is attached as Addendum
C).

8

Concerning the motion to suppress, defendant's hearing
counsel made no additional argument, but recalled Officer Haws
(R. 281-286).

Following Officer Haws testimony, the trial court

similarly denied defendant's motion to suppress:
[T]he Court would find that under the law we
are required to look at the totality of the
circumstances and the information contained
in the affidavit for search warrants [sic]
and that information needs to be looked at in
whether or not it provides a substantial
basis for the magistrate to conclude that
there was probable cause to believe that
there was contraband or evidence of crime
located in a certain place and describe that
place with such specificity.
In looking at the affidavit that was
presented in this particular case,
particularly the information provided by the
confidential informant, when the reliability
of that informant was tested and determined
as was done by the officer herein, the Court
would find that in looking at the affidavit
as a whole, there is a substantial basis from
which the magistrate could have concluded
that there was contraband or evidence of
illegality in the trailer of the defendant
and as it was described, that trailer was
significant particularly for those executing
the warrant to know where to look, and
therefore the Court will deny the motion to
suppress.
(R. 286) . The trial court subsequently filed written findings of
fact:
1. The confidential informant provided
Detective Gay Haws of the Davis Metro
Narcotics Strike Force with certain
information about the defendant including his
place of residence, his use and possession of
controlled substances, his vehicle and his
criminal background.
2. The informant provided the detective with
information that drugs were being stored at
9

the residence of Pam Tucker along with a
large amount of cash.
3. Detective Haws went to the residence of
Pam Tucker and located approximately [six]
pounds of marijuana and $12,000 in cash
consistent with the information provided by
the informant.
4. Detective Haws was able to confirm the
information relative to defendant's
residence, vehicle and criminal background as
provided by the informant.
5. The informant received no renumeration
for any of the information given to Detective
Haws.
(R. 92) , see Addendum C.
Based on the foregoing findings, the court concluded
that the affidavit set forth "sufficient" probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant (R. 93), see Addendum C.
Defendant was represented by current defense counsel at trial (R.
298).

Defense counsel again raised the motion to suppress, but

asserted no new arguments:
I was not representing Mr. Vigh at that time,
but it's [sic] my understanding of case law
under those circumstances, I don't have to
reobject to the admission of this evidence
based on the same judge. So rather than
having me object to 38 pieces of evidence,
which Mr. McGuire called, I would just like
it known that I would object to the
introduction of any evidence obtained as a
result of the search which we contend was
obtained in violation of Mr. Vigh's
constitutional guarantees and so I will not
be making -- well, I would like this to serve
as a continuing objection to any evidence
obtained as a result of either of the search
warrants.

10

(R. 306-07).

In reasserting the moti on to suppress, defense

counsel incorporated evidence seized incident to defendant's
arrest (R. 307).
B

Cocaine Residue

James Gaskill, of the Weber State University Crime
Laboratory, tested residue samples taken from the various drug
paraphernalia seized from defendant's trailer, as well as from
defendant's driver's license (R. 479-83, 492-493).

In all,

Gaskill performed three separate tests on the samples:

1) a

cobalt thiocyanate test, which revealed the presence of cocaine
hydrochloride; 2) a gold bromide test, which revealed the
presence of recr ysta] 1 Ized cocaine; and 3) a gas chromatography
test, which similarly confirmed that the samples contained
cocaine (R. 480-81, 492-93).
Although there was a sufficient amount of residue upon
which to conduct the foregoing tests, Gaskill was not able to
measure or otherwise quantify the cocaine residue (R. 485).
Further, Gaski 1 ] noted that the i esidue amounts wei: e consumable,
but it was not likely the residue was a sufficient amount "for
any kind of reaction on the part of the individual who consumed
it" (R 486).
C

Sentence Enhancement

Investigating officers made several measurements *:c
determine that defendant's mobile home was located *,
feet of Pioneer Adult Rehabilitation Center.

11

The officers

obtained a blueprint of Clearfield City from the planning
division of Clearfield City Corporation (R. 416, Exh. 35). 3
After determining the blueprint was drawn to a scale of one inch
for every 400 feet, the officers drew a 1,000 foot radius
emanating from the center of the mobile home park, which radius
cut through the middle of the rehabilitation center property.
Id.
Additionally, Officer Haws used a roller-meter to
measure the distance from defendant's trailer to the
rehabilitation center, stepping off two different routes (R. 35558).

The first pedestrian route measured 983 feet (R. 357). The

second, more direct route, measured 722 feet.

Id.

Both routes

required trespassing across railroad tracks running between the
rehabilitation center and the mobile home park (R. 360, Exh. 35).
The officer also climbed through some holes in a six foot chainlink fence surrounding the mobile home park (R. 359-60).

Officer

Haws estimated that a non-trespassory pedestrian route between
the center and defendant's trailer would accede 1,000 feet, but
did not make an exact measurement with the roller-meter (R. 36061) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded that the search
warrant affidavit set forth a substantial basis for the
magistrate's probable cause determination.
3

The affidavit

As depicted on the blueprint (Exh. 35), defendant's
mobile home park is outlined in red and the rehabilitation center
is outlined in blue (R. 416).
12

properly included defendant's criminal history as corroborative
of the confidential informant's allegations concerning
defendant's involvement in drug trafficking.

Based on the

officer's corroboration of defendant's criminal history and other
information provided by the informant, thei e is nc > clean ex: ror in
the trial court's determination that the informant was reliable.
Thus, the trial court's affirmance of the magistrate's probable
cause determination should be upheld.
The evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt
tc support the jiii: y ' s f i ndi rig that counts I-II were committed
within 1,000 feet of a school and were thus subject to an
enhanced penalty.

Defendant does not dispute evidence that his

mobile home was located within a 1,000 foot radius of the school.
Rather, defendant contends the method of measurement should take
into account physical and legal barriers separating the school
and the site of the c >ffense.

However, the straight line method

for measuring the statutory distance used here is consistent with
the policy objectives underlying the school zone enhancement
provision and should be expressly adopted by the Court as the
proper method for determining the statutory distance.
As for defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction for cocaine possession, the
Court should not even consider it because defendant has not
properly marshaled the evidence supporting the jury's verdict.
Even if the Court were to consider the merits of defendant's
claim, there was ample evidence before the jury to demonstrate
13

that defendant's possession of the cocaine residue was knowing
and intentional.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT SETS FORTH A
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE MAGISTRATE'S
PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION AND THERE IS NO
CLEAR ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S
DETERMINATION CONCERNING THE CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANT'S RELIABILITY
Defendant challenges the trial court's affirmance of
the magistrate's probable cause determination, alleging that the
search warrant affidavit 1) improperly set forth defendant's
criminal history and 2) "contains no indication of veracity or
reliability regarding the confidential informant[.]"
at 9-11.

Br. of App.

Contrary to defendant's assertions, his criminal

history was properly included in the affidavit as corroborative
of the confidential informant's allegation of defendant's
criminal conduct.

Moreover, there is no clear error in the trial

court's finding that the affidavit was sufficient to establish
the confidential informant's reliability.

Accordingly, the trial

court's affirmance of the magistrate's probable cause
determination was proper.
A. Deferential Review of Magistrate's
Probable Cause Determination
When a search warrant is challenged as having been
issued without probable cause, the reviewing court does not
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's determination of
probable cause; rather, to uphold the warrant, the reviewing
14

court must simply conclude that the magistrate had a "substantial
basis" for determining that probable cause existed.

State v.

Babbell. 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989); State v. Avala, 762 P.2d
1107, 1110 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
In conducting its examination, the reviewing court "should
consider a seai ch warrant affidavit xin its entire1 :y and i n a
common-sense fashion.'"

Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991 (quoting State

v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985)); State v. Purser,
828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992).

"Finally, the reviewing

court should pay 'great deference' to the magistrate's decision."
Babbell, 770 P.2d au r^x (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 236 (1983)).
B
Totality-of-the-Circumstances and
Informant Reliability
An informant's veracity, reliability and basis of
knowledge are factors to be considered i n determining whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, probable cause exists.
Purser. 828 P.2d at 517. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. However,
" [tlhey are not: stir let, independent requirements to be "rigidly
extracted' in every case."

State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 130

(Utah 1987) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230).

Rather, their

significance v ai :i es under the cii: eumstanees of each case .
Purser. 828 P.2d at 517 (citing State v. Bailey. 675 P.2d 1203,
1205 (Utah 1984))•

For example, "if the circumstances as a whole

demonstrate the truthfulness of the Informant's i epoi t, a less
strong showing is required."

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517.

15

C.

The Instant Case

Applying the Gates test to Officer Haws' affidavit, the
truthfulness of the informant's report is adequately
demonstrated.

While the first time informant had not previously

supplied information to any of the investigating officers, that
fact is not critical to the probable cause determination because
the informant's veracity and reliability is otherwise
demonstrated.

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. See also United v.

Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 581-582 (1971) (upholding search warrant
affidavit based on information gleaned from a first time
informant; "this Court [has] never suggested that an averment of
previous reliability was necessary").

Accord State v. Germane

559 A.2d 1031, 1035 (R.I. 1989); Meiia v. State, 761 S.W.2d 35,
39 (Tex. App. 1988); State v. Payne, 271 N.W.2d 350, 351 (Neb.
1978).
1.

Confidential Informant's Veracity and Reliability

Indeed,

fl

[c]ourts have consistently approved the

issuance of search warrants where the informant's knowledge is
based on personal observation."

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. See

also State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989), cert,
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); State v. White, 851 P.2d 1195,
1199 (Utah App. 1993).

Here, the affidavit clearly states the

basis of the informant's knowledge was his/her first hand
observation of defendant's criminality.

See Addendum A.

Moreover, the observations were recent, occurring in the "last 10
days" prior to the warrant's issuance.
16

Id.

The informant's veracity is further buttressed by the
fact that he/she received nothing in exchange for the information
provided.

See Addendum A.

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517; State v.

Blaha, 851 P. 2d 120T., 1207 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Brooks, 849
P.2d 640, 645 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied. No. 930182 (Utah
Aug. 11, 1993).

Similarly demonstrative of the informant's

veracity JH ttu3 J nt" u manf ' s admission against his. her penal
interest, that he/she had previously used marijuana.4
Addendum A.

See

Harris, 403 U.S. at 583-84 ("Admissions of crime,

like admissions against proprietary interests, car i y their own
indicia of credibility[.]"). Accord People v. TurcotteSchaeffer. 843 P.2d 658, 661 (Colo. 1993); State v. Erwin, 789
S.W.2d 509, 511 (Mo. App. 1990); State v. 0'Connor

692 P.2d 208,

212 (Wash. App. 1984).

4

At trial, defendant was represented by current counsel,
who questioned Officer Haws concerning a search of the
confidential informant's residence conducted sometime prior to
the execution of the instant search warrant (R. 361-62). The
officer testified that approximately six pounds of marijuana was
discovered and that the informant had not been charged with any
criminal conduct as a result of the search. Id. Defense counsel
did not further pursue the matter below, nor has he specifically
addressed it on appeal.
Rather, on appeal defendant merely asserts that the
affidavit "contradicts itself" because it states "that the
confidential informant is a citizen informant who is not
receiving renumeration, and then affirmatively assert[s] that the
informant is a known user of controlled substances." Br. of App.
at 10. However, contrary to defendant's allegation, the
foregoing conduct is not contradictory. Although the informant
was previously involved in drugs, he/she, for whatever reason,
decided to cooperate with law enforcement in this case.
17

2.

Independent Corroboration of Significant Facts

Additionally, the informant's reliability was manifest
by the officers' independent corroboration of the significant
facts.

See Addendum A.

Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. As alleged by

the informant, the officers found approximately four pounds of
marijuana in the crawl space of Pam Tucker's home, as well as
$12,000 in cash.

See Addendum A.

The officers were also able to

verify defendant's address, and vehicle, consistent with the
information provided by the informant.

Id.

Because the

informant was found to be reliable concerning the above
information, his/her assertion that defendant was involved in
drug trafficking was therefore likely to be similarly reliable.
See Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 (because an informant is shown to be
right about some things, he is probably right about other facts
that he has alleged including the claim that the object of the
tip is engaged in criminal activity).
As further corroboration of the informant's
allegations, Officer Haws obtained defendant's criminal history
which indicated defendant had two prior convictions for drug
related offenses in 1986, as well as a 1990 charge for possession
of a controlled substance which was "disposed of by diversion."
See Addendum A.

Relying on Brooks. 849 P.2d at 644, defendant

asserts his criminal record cannot properly "be considered in the
probable cause determination."

Br. of App. at 9.

reliance on Brooks is misplaced.
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Defendant's

In Brooks, the Court determined that information Brooks
was under investigation for drug trafficking in a neighboring
jurisdiction, and also had a criminal history of drug related
offenses, did nothing to establish probable cause that he was
involved in drug trafficking at the time the search warrant was
issued.

849 P.2d at 644. However, the central issue in Brooks

was not the propriety of including Brooks' criminal history in
the affidavit, but whether the informant's controlled buys from
Brooks, which were also set forth in the affidavit, provided a
substantial basis for the magistrate's probable cause
determination.

849 P.2d at 643-45. Thus, neither the parties,

nor the Court, focused on the criminal history issue raised here.
This lack of focus is demonstrated in the Court's
comments concerning inclusion of Brooks' criminal history in the
search warrant affidavit.

Specifically, the Court neither

reviewed nor acknowledged relevant authority from the United
States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court and this Court
recognizing that a defendant's prior criminal history is properly
included in a search warrant affidavit as corroborative of the
informant's assertions of criminality.

See Jones v. United

States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960) (Court upheld search warrant
affidavit containing statement that Jones had previously admitted
using narcotics on the ground that the information "made the
charge against [Jones] much less subject to scepticism than would
be such a charge against one without such a history"); Bailey,
675 P.2d at 1206 (upholding search warrant affidavit where there
it

was "prior verification of significant facts [,]" including "a
prior police record of the individual suspected of having
committed the crime"); Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 55 (noting
defendant's prior conviction for unlawful possession corroborated
informant's statements); State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1385
(Utah App. 1991) (finding affidavit adequately established
informant reliability based, in part, on officers' verification
of defendant's prior criminal record).

Accord Commonwealth v.

Spano, 605 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Mass. 1993) (independent police
corroboration of informant's allegations properly included
defendant's criminal history); People v. Maldonado, 465 N.Y.S.2d
958, 962 (N.Y. Sup. 1983) (defendant's criminal history "is
corroborative in nature -- that is, there is much less skepticism
surrounding an informant's information than would be the case if
the police were not aware of the defendant's prior, drug-related
criminal history"); State v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904, 907 (Colo.
1986) (defendant's prior criminal record of drug-related offenses
corroborated details of informant's tip).
Further, in State v. Singleton, another panel of this
Court rejected a staleness challenge to the search warrant
affidavit on the ground the affidavit recited facts "indicating
[Singleton] was involved in continuous and ongoing criminal
activity," including delineation of "a substantial history of
controlled substance violations."
1993).

854 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah App.

Thus, "[v]iewed under the totality of the circumstances,"

the Singleton court found the "information contained in the
20

affidavit sufficiently demonstrate[d] probable continuous and
contemporaneous criminal activity at defendant's residence."

Id.

On the other hand, the only indication Brooks was
involved in an ongoing drug trafficking scheme was a "concerned
citizen complaint that occurred some nine months earlier."
Brooks. 849 P.2d at 644. Consequently, the Brooks affidavit,
unlike the Singleton affidavit, was found inadequate to establish
the probable existence of continuous

criminal activity.

The

Court thus determined that inclusion of Brooks' criminal history
did not contribute to the probable cause determination in that
case.

Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644. See also State v. Potter, 221

Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 3 0 (Utah App. 1993) (concluding that fact
Potter was under investigation by local drug agencies and fact
that his companion was a convicted drug user, without more,
failed to establish controlled substances would presently be
found in his trailer).
However, had the facts alleged in the Brooks affidavit
established ongoing criminal activity, Brooks' criminal record
may well have properly contributed to the probable cause
determination.

See, e.g., Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1021.

Additionally, although the Brooks panel failed to consider the
issue, Brooks' criminal record was at least corroborative of the
informant's allegations and was arguably properly included in the
affidavit on that ground.

See Jones, 362 U.S. at 271; Bailey,

675 P.2d at 1206; Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 55; Buford, 820 P.2d at
1385.

See also State v. Lee, No. 920566-CA, slip op. at 12 (Utah
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App. October 22, 1993) (recognizing affiant officer's knowledge
of suspect's "history of substance abuse and sales," helped to
corroborate confidential informant's observations of
criminality).

For these reasons, the Brooks analysis is

meaningful only as applied to the unique facts of that case and
should not be read to preclude consideration of a suspect's
criminal history in all cases. Thus, Brooks notwithstanding,
defendant's criminal history was properly included in the search
warrant affidavit if for no other purpose than to corroborate the
informant's allegations of defendant's criminality.
Based on the foregoing analysis of the search warrant
affidavit, defendant's assertions fail to demonstrate any clear
error in the trial court's determination that the informant's
reliability was adequately established (R. 286) . See also (R.
92), see Addendum C.

Brooks v. State, 431 S.E.2d 466 (Ga. App.

1993) (trial court's determination of informant reliability
subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review).

Accord

Brooks, 849 P.2d at 643 ("factual findings underlying the denial
of a motion to suppress evidence" are reviewed under a 'clearly
erroneous' standard).

The trial court's affirmance of the

magistrate's probable cause determination was proper and should
be upheld.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S FINDING THAT THE OFFENSES OCCURRED
WITHIN 1,000 FEET OF A SCHOOL FOR PURPOSES OF
SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §
58-37-8(5)(a) and 8(5)(c) (SUPP. 1993)
Defendant contends "[t]here is insufficient evidence to
support the jury verdict that [defendant's actions took place
within 1,000 feet of a school."

Br. of App. at 11.

In so

arguing, "[d]efendant asks the Court to define the most direct
non-trespassory route available as the proper measurement" for
calculating the distance from his mobile home to the school for
purposes of sentence enhancement under Utah Code Ann. 58-378(5) (a), (c) (Supp. 1993).

Br. of App. at 16. Defendant's

argument is inconsistent with the underlying policy objectives of
the statutory enhancement scheme and should be rejected.
A.

Sufficiency Standard

The power of this Court to review a jury verdict
challenged on sufficiency of evidence is "quite limited."
v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 783 (Utah App. 1990).

State

As this Court has

recognized,
[i]n challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence, the burden on the defendant is
heavy. Defendant must 'marshal all evidence
supporting the jury's verdict and must then
show how this marshaled evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict even when
viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict.'
State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992) (citations
omitted), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
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B.

The Inst am t Case

Although defendant has marshaled the evidence
supporting the jury's verdict, Br. of App. at 12-13, he has not
demonstrated that, viewed in its most favorable light, the
evidence is insufficient to support the jury's enhancement
verdict.

Specifically, defendant does not dispute evidence that

his mobile home is located within a 1,000 foot radius of the
rehabilitation center.

Br. of App. at 16. Rather,

notwithstanding the evidence, defendant contends the straight
line method used to calculate the statutory distance (R. 416,
Exh. 35) is improper because it does not take into account chainlink fencing surrounding the mobile home park, or railroad
property rights.

Br. of App. at 16.5 Defendant suggests a

proper measuring system under the statute would take into account
physical and legal barriers between the school and the site of
the offense.

Defendant's tortuous reading of the enhancement

provision should be rejected.
1. Utah's Enhancement Provision
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (a) (ix) (Supp. 1993)
provides for the enhancement of certain drug related offenses
committed "within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections 5(a)(i) through (viii)[.]
5

Defendant also asserts that the rehabilitation center
is surrounded by a barbed wire fence. Br. of App. at 16.
However, defendant provides no record support for this assertion.
State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986); State v. Bingham,
684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984) (reviewing court cannot consider
matters outside of the record).
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Subsection (5)(a)(ii) prohibits the commission of drug related
offenses "in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary school or on the grounds of any of those schools[.]"6
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
6

As noted, section 58-37-8 (5) (a) enumerates several
locations or zones where, if a drug related offense is committed
therein, the perpetrator is subject to enhanced "penalties and
classifications under [s]ubsection (5)(b)[.]lf However,
subsection (5)(b) provides only for the enhancement of first
degree felony convictions. The enhancement of convictions which
are "less than a first degree felony" is addressed in subsection
(5)(c), which subsection is not expressly referenced in
subsection (5)(a).
The legislature's failure to expressly refer to both
subsection (5)(b) and subsection (5)(c) in subsection (5)(a) is
merely a technical omission and should not be read to prohibit
enhancement of convictions other than first degree felony
convictions. Indeed, the school zone enhancement provision only
makes sense when subsection (5)(a) is read to incorporate both
subsection (5)(b) and subsection (5)(c). The only logical
construction of subsection (5) is that the legislature intended
to enhance any conviction for a drug-related offense committed
within the prohibited areas specified in subsection (5)(a). To
construe the statute otherwise is to defeat its purpose. See
Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035
(Utah 1971) ("where there is ambiguity or uncertainty in a
portion of a statute, it is proper to look to the entire act in
order to discern its meaning and intent; and if it is reasonably
susceptible of different interpretations, the one should be
chosen which best harmonizes with its general purpose");
RDG Assoc./Jorman Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n.. 741 P.2d 948, 951
(Utah 1987) ("a proper construction of the statute must further
its purposes"); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R.. 749
P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App.) (same), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278
(Utah 1988). See also Sutherland's
Stat.
Constr.
§46.05 at 103
(5th Ed.) ("a statutory subsection may not be considered in a
vacuum, but must be considered in reference to the statute as a
whole").
Finally, defendant has not complained of the matter on
appeal and the State's suggested construction has been implicitly
recognized by the Court. See State v. Strombercr. 783 P.2d 54,
59-60 (Utah App. 1989) (affirming without comment Stromberg's
ehanced third degree felony conviction for unlawful possession of
marijuana within 1,000 feet of a public school), cert, denied,
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
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section 58-37-8(5) in State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
Specifically, Moore argued that the school zone enhancement
provision violated equal protection because it "treat[ed] drug
dealers in small towns differently from those in large cities."
Id. at 503. The court's comments in rejecting Moore's
constitutional challenge suggest that a straight line method for
measuring the statutory distance is proper:

"'The bright line

test' is based strictly on distance from the school, regardless
of the town's population or configuration."

Id.

The "bright

line test" articulated in Moore is consistent with the supreme
court's recognition of the policy objectives underlying the
legislature's enactment of the school zone enhancement provision:
[U]nder the police power, the state
legislature has taken measures to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare of
children of Utah from the presumed extreme
potential danger created when drug
transactions occur on or near a school
ground.
Id.
This Court has similarly upheld the constitutionality
of the enhancement provision, and has also recognized the
legislature's intent to create a "drug-free zone"

around schools

"to protect children from the influence of drug-related
activity."

State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 60 (Utah App. 1989)

emphasis added), cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
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2.

Federal Authority is Persuasive

It is significant that section 58-37-8(5) was
"fashioned" after the federal Controlled Substances Penalties
Amendments Act of 1984.

Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 59 n.3. The

federal act, which "increases the penalty for 'distributing,
possessing with intent to distribute, or manufacturing a
controlled substance' within enumerated distances from schools,
colleges, universities, and certain youth facilities!,]'" has
also "withstood a number of constitutional challenges." Id.
Because Utah's enhancement provision is modeled after the federal
act, interpretative federal case law is persuasive.

See, e.g..

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984) ("Case law
developed under the Fourteenth Amendment may be persuasive in
applying Article I, § 24, "of the Utah Constitution).
At least three federal courts of appeal have expressly
rejected arguments similar to defendant's, determining that the
"straight line" method is clearly contemplated by the plain
meaning of the federal act.

See United States v. Clavis, 956

F-2d 1079, 1088 (11th Cir.) ("the statutory distance must be
measured by a straight line method rather than a pedestrian
travel route"), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 2979

(1992); United States v. Watson. 887 F.2d 980, 981 (9th Cir.
1989) ("[W]e hold that the distance between the school and the
sale should be measured by a straight line and not by any
"pedestrian" route of travel."); United States v. Ofarril. 779
F.2d 791, 792 (2nd Cir. 1985) (rejecting argument that the
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statutory distance should be measured by pedestrian route rather
than by straight line as "tortuous" of the statute's plain
meaning), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1029 (1986).

Cf. United States

v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C. Cir.) (purpose of federal
act was to create a "1000-foot zone of protection" around
schools), cert, denied. 481 U.S. 1057 (1987).

See also United

States v. Robles. 814 F.Supp. 1249, 1251 (E.D.Pa. 1993) ("The
distance from the protected zone is measured by straight line,
not by pedestrian route.").

Accord State v. Wims, 847 P.2d 8, 12

(Wash. App. 1993) ("We adhere to the measurement of the
prohibited zone as the radius of a circle emanating from the
location of the school grounds.").
The reasoning behind adoption of a straight line method
for measuring the statutory distance is sound.

As noted by the

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the 1,000 foot zone of
prohibition around schools is
designed to protect school-children from the
direct and indirect dangers posed by the
narcotics trade. School children are not
known for taking what adults may conclude
would be the most appropriate routes to and
from school. Only a straight line
measurement creates a readily ascertainable
zone of protection. . . . This intent to
create a %drug-free zone around schools,'
would be defeated if dealers were allowed to
escape prosecution by creating circuitous
routes to their narcotic transactions.
Watson, 887 F.2d at 981. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit similarly reasoned that
[t]he uncertainties created by the way a
child meanders, or a drug dealer or buyer
walks, is antithetical to the expressed
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intention of Congress to create a drug-free
zone around each school. The way to create a
definite and identifiable zone is by
extending radii outward around the property
on which the school is located.
Clavis, 956 F.2d at 1079.
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reject
defendant's reading of Utah's school zone enhancement provision
and expressly adopt a straight line method for measuring the
statutory distance.

Only the straight line method is consistent

with the legislature's clear policy objective of creating drugfree zones around Utah's schools.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF COCAINE
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction for cocaine possession, Br. of
App. at 18-20, should be rejected for failure to comply with the
marshaling requirements of State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 783
(Utah App. 1990).

As previously noted in Point II, supra, the

power of this Court to review a jury verdict challenged on
sufficiency of evidence is "quite limited."

Id.

Defendant must

first marshal all the supporting evidence, and then show how the
marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict,
even when viewed in its most favorable light.

State v. Lemons,

844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted), cert.
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
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A.

Defendant's Failure to Marshal

Defendant has failed to meet this purposefully heavy
burden.

Rather than marshalling all the evidence supporting the

jury's verdict and then demonstrating how the marshaled evidence
is insufficient to support his conviction for cocaine possession,
defendant asserts that cocaine soiled paper money is so prevalent
in our society "that one-third of all the people deplaning at
Salt Lake City from flights from Chicago, and carrying paper
money, could be charged and convicted of possession of cocaine."
Br. of App. at 19.

Significantly, although large amounts of cash

were seized from defendant's person and from his trailer, there
was no allegation below that the money was "cocaine soiled."
Thus, defendant's argument completely ignores the supporting
evidence.

The Court should refuse to consider defendant's

insufficiency claim based on his failure to properly marshal the
evidence supporting the jury's verdict.
B. Evidence Supports Jury's Determination
That Defendant's Possession Was Knowing and
Intentional
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's
sufficiency challenge, there was ample evidence to support
defendant's conviction.

Defendant does not argue that the State

failed to prove he exercised control over the cocaine residue
seized from his person, and from his trailer.

Br. of App. 17.

Nor does he dispute the narcotic character of the residue seized.
Id.

Defendant's only complaint is "that there was insufficient

cocaine to justify a conviction."
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Id.

Specifically, defendant

asserts that society's resources are better spent prosecuting
suspects apprehended in possession of larger, quantifiable
amounts of controlled substances.

Br. of App. at 20.

Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court have
expressly determined whether a particular quantity of narcotics
is necessary to sustain a conviction for possession of a narcotic
drug.

State v. Warner. 788 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Utah App. 1990) .7

Rather, in Utah "[t]he determinative test is possession of a
narcotic drug, and not useability of a narcotic drug."
Winters, 12 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872, 874 (Utah 1964).

State v.
Further,

"the key in prosecuting for unlawful possession of narcotics is
proving that 'the accused exercised dominion and control over the
drug with knowledge of its presence and narcotic character.'"
Warner, 788 P.2d at 1043 (quoting Winters, 396 P.2d at 874).
The visible amount of drug in defendant's possession,
along with other circumstantial evidence, was sufficient for the
jury to determine that defendant's possession was knowing and
intentional.

State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985).

It is

significant that the visible cocaine residue in evidence was
discovered inside drug paraphernalia seized from defendant's
trailer (R. 479-81), premises over which defendant exercised
control and exclusive occupancy.

Id.

Cocaine residue was also

discovered inside the plastic flap of defendant's driver's
7

However, both have acknowledged that "'several courts
have held that no particular quantity of narcotics is necessary
to sustain a conviction for possession of a narcotic drug.'"
Warner, 788 P.2d at 1043 (quoting State v. Winters, 396 P.2d 872,
874 (Utah 1964)) .
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license (R. 492-93), a personal effect over which he had special
control.

Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. Thus, viewed in its proper light

on appeal, the evidence presented at trial provides substantial
support for the jury's verdict.

This Court should reject

defendant's sufficiency challenge.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress should be upheld and
defendant's convictions affirmed.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-4300
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

I

In Re: Search of the mobile home:
located at 442 South State, #66,
Clearfield, a single wide trailer
beige in color with dark brown
trim, occupied by Dennis Richard
Vigh and the vehicle described
as a 1989 Ford Tempo, license
#217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453,
registered to Dennis Vigh.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss.

AFFIDAVIT FOR
SEARCH WARRANT

Before Alfred C. VanWagenen, Circuit Court Judge, the
undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that there
is probable cause to believe that on the premises and vehicle
described as follows:
The mobile home located at 442 South State, #66,
Clearfield, Utah, a single wide trailer beige in
color with dark brown trim, occupied by Dennis
Richard Vigh; and a 1989 Ford Tempo, license
number 217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453, registered
to Dennis Richard Vigh*
there is now certain property or evidence described ass
Controlled substances including marijuana and cocaine
Items of drug paraphernalia
Documents evidencing the sale of controlled substances
Documents evidencing the ownership and occupancy of the
residence
Money

and that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired and is
being unlawfully possessed and is evidence of the crime of
possession of controlled substances.
The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are
as follows:
1. Affiant received information from a confidential
informant that Dennis Richard Vigh is engaged in the sale of
marijuana and cocaine.

The informant stated that Vigh resides in

Clearfield at the Clearfield Trailer Park, #66, located a few
blocks south of Crown Billiards. The informant stated that
marijuana was seen in the presence of Vigh personally by the
informant and the informant is knowledgeable about marijuana
because the informant has used it in the past.

The informant

also indicated that cocaine and paraphernalia had been seen by
the informant in Vigh's presence.

Both of the items had been

seen at Vigh's residence during the last 10 days.
2.

The informant stated that Vigh had been under the

home of Pam Tucker in Sunset and believed he may have stashed
something there.

The informant further stated that the informant

believed that Vigh also kept a large amount of money at Tucker's
residence•
3. The informant stated that during the last 10 days
the informant had also observed marijuana in Vigh's presence in
his vehicle.

The vehicle was described as a 1988 Ford Tempo,

two-door, creme in color, license number 217 EVE.
4.

The informant stated that Vigh was selling a large

amount of controlled substances sufficient to store house a large

amount of money which was kept at Tucker's residence and that of
Vigh's mother, who lives in Sunset.
5. Affiant went to Pam Tucker's residence located at
261 West 1425 North, Sunset and conducted a search of that
residence.

During the search, affiant located three to four

pounds of marijuana underneath the home in a crawl space.
Affiant also located a large amount of money totalling
approximately $12,000.
6.

Affiant spoke with Detective Dave Nance who stated

that he went to the Clearfield Trailer Park and observed it to be
located at 442 South State.

He stated he looked at #66 and

observed it to be a single wide mobile home, beige in color with
brown trim.

Affiant spoke with personnel at Clearfield Police

Department who stated that the manager of Clearfield Trailer Park
indicated that Dennis Vigh lived at that address.
7.

Affiant contacted Bountiful dispatch and was

informed that Vigh has a 1989 Ford with license 217 EVE, vin
#1FAPP31X7KK103453 registered to him.
8.

Affiant obtained a criminal history on Vigh which

showed that Vigh was convicted on June 2, 1986 of Arranging for
the Sale of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony and
Attempted Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a third degree
felony.

Affiant observed a search warrant in that case, a copy

of which is attached and made a part of this affidavit.

Affiant

also noted that Vigh was charged with Possession of Cocaine in
March, 1990.

The records of the Davis County Attorneys Office

shows that this matter was disposed of by diversion.

The

criminal record also showed that Vigh was charged with possession
of controlled substances in 1980 and 1983 •
9. Affiant believes that based upon affiant's
independent investigation, the information supplied by the
informant is accurate. Affiant further believes that the
information is reliable based upon the fact that the informant
has come forward as a citizen and is not receiving any
remuneration for the information provided.
10.

Affiant has been involved in the investigation of

controlled substance violations for over one year and during that
time has been involved in numerous searches of residences
involving individuals who sell controlled substances.

In each of

those instances, drug paraphernalia has been located.

Affiant is

also aware from experience and courses attended on the
investigation of such offenses, that individuals who sell
controlled substances often maintain records of such sales in
their residences.
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a Search Warrant be
issued for the search of the above-described premises and vehicle
and the seizure of the items being searched for.

Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
June, 1992.

Circuit Court Judge

day of

LOREN D. MARTIN
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-3227
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON DEPARTMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
In Re: Search of the
^
premises described as
450 South 546 East, Apt. C,
Clearfield, Utah.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss:

SEARCH WARRANT

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by
Kent Lewis, Davis County Metro Narcotic Strike Force, that he has
reason to believe that in the below-described premises there are
items which constitute evidence of the commission of a crime.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED in the daytime, to make
immediate search of the premises described as:
450 South 546 East, Apt. C,
Clearfield, Utah,
and search for the following property:
Marijuana,
Paraphernalia associated with the use or
packaging of marijuana,
Mushrooms,
Chemical psilocyn.

And if you find the same or any part thereof to bring it
forthwith before me at the Circuit Court# County of Davis, or
retain such property in your custody subject to the order of this
Court.
Given under my hand and dated this fa^

day of December,

1985.

Circuit Court Judge

LOREN D. MARTIN
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-3227
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON DEPARTMENT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

In Re: Search of the
premises described as
450 South 546 East, Apt.C,
Clearfield, Utah.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss:

:

AFFIDAVIT FOR

:

SEARCH WARRANT

:

Before K. Roger Bean, Circuit Court Judge, an officer
having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person
charged with a public offense, the undersigned, being first duly
sworn, deposes and says that he has probable cause to believe
that on the premises which are described as:
450 South 546 East Apt C
Clearfield, Utah,
there is now certain property described as:
Marijuana,
Paraphernalia associated with the use or
packaging of marijuana,
Mushrooms,
Chemical psilocyn.

The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are
as follows:
1. On September 19, 1985, Agent Paul Rapp of the Davis
County Metro Narcotics Strike Force purchased marijuana from
Dennis Vigh.
2. On September 24, 1985, Agent Rapp purchased psilocyn
mushrooms from Dennis Vigh.
3. A confidential informant told Brian Wallace, Clinton
Police Department, that Dennis Vigh was selling marijuana from
his residence at 450 South 546 East, Apt C., Clinton, Utah.
4. A different confidential informant told Steve Hill,
Clearfield Police Department, that he or she, the informant, was
a resident of Townhouse Apartments which is the complex of the
above listed apartment, and that he had seen many persons coming
and going from the apartment at all hours of the night and day
and that the informant had witnessed exchanges at the door. Such
a pattern of traffic is typical of that where drugs are being
sold.
5.

A third confidential informant told Detective William

Holthaus of Clearfield Police Department that he had been in the
above-described apartment and had seen a dresser drawer filled
with marijuana on October 21, 1985.
6.

A fourth confidential informant advised Agent Rapp

and Agent Allen Larsen of the State Narcotics and Liquor Law
Enforcement Bureau, that Dennis Vigh sells marijuana from the
above-described location and this informant introduced Agent Rapp
to Vigh for the purpose of making the buys mentioned in

paragraphs 1 and 2 herein.

The information from this informant

is therefore considered reliable.
7.

your affiant is supervisory agent of the Davis County

Metro Narcotics Strike Force and in that capacity received the
information outlined herein from the agents and officers named.
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued
for the search of the above-described premises and the seizure of
any of the said items.

Sf nA
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to me this £L

day of December, 1985,

D

<d , Lff/A^Qju^^
Circuit Court Judge

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)
)

ss

RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT

I hereby certify, and return, that by virtue of the within
Search Warrant to me directed, I have searched for the goods and
chattels therein named, at the place therein described: (Strike
either (1) or (2), whichever is inapplicable)
(1) and that I have such goods and chattels before the Court,
described as follows:

^Jfi)

and that I have been unable to find such goods and chattels.
an

rant was executed, do swear that the above inventory contains a true
and detailed account of all the property taken by me on the Warrant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
19

Judge
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MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-4300
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
In Re: Search of the mobile home
located at 442 South State, #66,
Clearfield, a single wide trailer
beige in color with dark brown
trim, occupied by Dennis Richard
Vigh and the vehicle described
as a 1989 Ford Tempo, license
#217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453,
registered to Dennis Vigh.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss.

SEARCH WARRANT

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS:
Proof by Affidavit having this day been made before me
by Gary Haws, Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force, that there is
probable cause to believe that in the below-described premises
and vehicle there is property or evidence which:
(1) Was unlawfully acquired and is unlawfully
possessed.
(2)

Is evidence of the crime of possession of

controlled substances.
YOU ARE THEREFORE AUTHORIZED AND ORDERED to search the
premises and vehicle described as:
The mobile home located at 442 South State, #66,

Clearfield, Utah, a single wide trailer beige in
color with dark brown trim, occupied by Dennis
Richard Vigh; and a 1989 Ford Tempo, license
number 217 EVE, vin #1FAPP31X7KK103453, registered
to Dennis Richard Vigh.
and search for the following property or evidence:
Controlled substances including marijuana and cocaine
Items of drug paraphernalia
Documents evidencing the sale of controlled substances
Documents evidencing the ownership and occupancy of the
residence
Money
If the same or any part thereof is discovered and seized, it may
be brought before the magistrate or retained in police custody
subject to further court order.
This Warrant shall be served in the daytime, and must
be served within ten days from the date of issuance.
Given under my hand and dated this
1992.

Circuit Court Judge
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DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY
MELVIN C. WILSON

J u l y 14, 1992

Dennis Richard Vigh
Inmate - Davis County Jail
Farmingtori, Utah
Re:

State v. Dennis Richard Vigh
Case Nos. 921000534 & 921000548

Mr. Vigh:
The purpose of this letter is to advise you that the
preliminary hearings in the above referenced matters previously
scheduled for Friday, July 17, 1992 have been re-scheduled to
Monday, July 20, 1992 at 2:00 p.m. by
"
Sine

Willi!
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OFFICE OF THE DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY
DAVIS COUNTY JUSTICE COMPLEX
800 WEST STATE STREET
P.O. BOX 618
FARM1NGTON, UTAH 84025-0618

S^cSfcMfiaU.S.P0
V
MAILPW

<r

Dennis Richard Vigh
Inmate - Davis County Jail
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ADDENDUM C

FILED IN CLERK'S

William K. McGuire 42192
Davis County Attorney's Office
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-4300
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIfiftSSGl?LERK

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case Nos. 921700334 & 0336

DENNIS R. VIGH,
Defendant.

Hon. Rodney S. Page, Judge

A series of motions filed by the Defendant came on for
hearing before the above-entitled Court on the 27th day of October,
1992.

The

defendant

was

present

and

represented

by

David

Grindstaff, the State was represented by William K. McGuire.

The

Court heard testimony relative to some of the motions and received
memoranda from the parties relative to the other motions and the
Court having considered the testimony and the memoranda, makes the
following rulings and orders on the motions:
MOTION TO SEVER
The Court

has heretofore

granted

defendant's

motion

to

sever trial on the two files charging the defendant with criminal
offenses.
MOTION TO DISCOVER
The defendant requested copies of all police reports in
both cases as well as witnesses to be called in each. Pursuant to
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the answer of the plaintiff, it appears that all police reports and
witnesses have been submitted to the defendant and this request has
been complied with fully by the State of Utah.
Defendant

requested

disclosure

of

the

confidential

informant in Case No. 921700334 and testimony was taken relative to
the necessity of disclosure of the confidential informant.

Based

upon such testimony, the Court enters the following:
Findings of Facts
1.

The confidential informant provided Detective Gary

Haws of the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force with certain
information about the defendant including his place of residence,
his use and possession of controlled substances, his vehicle and
his criminal background.
2. The informant provided the detective with information
that drugs were being stored at the residence of Pam Tucker along
with a large amount of cash.
3.

Detective Haws went to the residence of Pam Tucker

and located approximately 6 pounds of marijuana and $12f000 in cash
consistent with the information provided by the informant.
4.

Detective Haws was able to confirm the information

relative to defendant's residence, vehicle and criminal background
as provided by the informant.
5. The informant received no remuneration for any of the
information given to Detective Haws.
The Court having entered its findings of fact, now makes
the following:

00160598

Conclusions of Law
1.
Detective

There was no substantial preliminary showing that

Haws

intentionally

or

knowingly

or

with

reckless

disregard for truth, falsely swore relative to any information
received from the informant.
2.

That probable cause existed for the issuance of the

search warrant based upon the information provided by the informant
and verified by Detective Haws.
The Court having entered

its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law hereby Orders that pursuant to Rule 505 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence, the identity of the informant should not be
disclosed.
BILL OF PARTICULARS
Defendant's

request

for a bill

of

particulars was

sufficiently answered by the State of Utah.
MOTION IN LIMINE
Defendant

requests

that

language

concerning

the

enhancement due to a prior conviction not be mentioned at trial nor
be read at trial and that the enhancement be dropped from the
language of the charge. The Court hereby orders that a bifurcated
proceeding should be followed in the trial of the case wherein the
enhancement language relative to the prior conviction shall not be
read to the jury as a part of the charge nor shall it be referred
to during the trial of the underlying charge.
the

defendant

is

convicted

of

the

In the event that

underlying

offense,

the

determination of a prior conviction shall then be presented for
enhancement

purposes.

The

Court

further

Orders

that

OOifiORdft

the

enhancement is not violative of the ex post facto provisions of the
United States Constitution, but that the prior conviction merely
enhances a subsequent act to make it more serious than it would
otherwise be had the individual not been convicted.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
The Court heard testimony relative to defendant's motion
to suppress and based upon such testimony enters the following
Findings of Fact.
Findings of Facts
1.

The confidential informant provided Detective Gary

Haws of the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force with certain
information about the defendant including his place of residence,
his use and possession of controlled substances, his vehicle and
his criminal background.
2. The informant provided the detective with information
that drugs were being stored at the residence of Pam Tucker along
with a large amount of cash.
3.

Detective Haws went to the residence of Pam Tucker

and located approximately 6 pounds of marijuana and $12,000 in cash
consistent with the information provided by the informant.
4.

Detective Haws was able to confirm the information

relative to defendant's residence, vehicle and criminal background
as provided by the informant.
5. The informant received no remuneration for any of the
information given to Detective Haws.
The Court having entered its Findings of Facts, now makes
the following:
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Conclusions of Law
1.

That there was probable cause contained in the

affidavit sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant on
defendant's residence.
2.

That no showing of bias on the part of the judge or

of any erroneous information is present.
The Court having
Conclusions

entered

its Findings of Fact and

of Law hereby Orders that defendant's motion to

suppress is denied.
MOTION TO DISMISS
The Court has previously ruled on defendant's motion to
dismiss finding that the bind over of the matters were pursuant to
sufficient probable cause for the sitting magistrate to bind the
matters over for trial. The Court has further reviewed the record
of the proceedings consistent with plaintiff's memorandum and finds
that there was no error in failing to postpone the preliminary
hearing at the request of the defendant, nor any problem with the
defendant

being

advised

of

the

charges

and

provided

with

information relative to the charges and therefore defendant's
motion to dismiss is denied.
DATED this

3*^

day of

fUr^t-t^

1992.

BY THE COURT:

)DNEY S J PAGE, Jildge
RODNEY
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed an unexecuted

copy of the

foregoing Order on Defendant's Motions, with postage prepaid
thereon, to David L. Grindstaff, at 395 South 600 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84102, this w^Q^day of October, 1992.
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